Acinetobacter baumannii isolates are important opportunistic pathogens in different units of hospitals, particularly the intensive care unit (ICU). They can cause various infections such as pneumonia associated with endotracheal tubes or tracheostomies, endocarditis, meningitis, skin and wound infections, peritonitis, and urinary tract infections (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . The major risk factors for A. baumannii infections include trauma, mechanical ventilation, immunosuppression, surgical procedures, intravenous catheterization, tracheostomy, enteral nutrition, and the use of antibiotics such as third-generation cephalosporins, fluoroquinolone, or carbapenem (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) . A. baumannii outbreaks mainly originate from an environmental source such as patient's beds, air conditioners, monitors, telephone receivers, or ventilation equipments (5, 8) . Information regarding the clonal relationship between A. baumannii isolates may aid in preventing the spread of resistant strains among patients and improving the efficiency of control measures in hospitals.
This study aimed to analyze the clinical and bacteriological properties of an A. baumannii outbreak observed among patients in the ICU and isolation room (IR) of 82.Yil Rize State Hospital, a 250-bed facility, in June 2011.
We analyzed 6 clinical samples from 5 patients and 43 environmental samples from the 10-bed ICU and 5-bed IR, which is next to the ICU. The type of samples is shown in Table 1 . All the samples were plated on eosinmethylene blue (EMB) agar and blood agar. The presumptive Acinetobacter isolates, which were oxidase-negative, non-lactose fermenting, and Gramnegative diplococci, were identified to the species level using conventional biochemical tests, growth ability at 379 C and 449 C, and BBL Crystal Identification Systems (Enteric/Nonfermenter ID Kit; Becton Dickinson and Co., Paramus, N.J., USA) (9) . The isolates were also identified using both OXA-51 specific PCR (10) and 16S rDNA sequencing (11) .
Antibiotic susceptibility of the isolates was determined by the Kirby Bauer disk diffusion method (12, 13) . Ampicillin-sulbactam (10 mg/10 mg), piperacillin (100 mg), netilmicin (30 mg), cefepime (30 mg), ceftazidime (30 mg), ceftriaxone (30 mg), imipenem (10 mg), meropenem (10 mg), gentamicin (10 mg), amikacin (30 mg), levofloxacin (5 mg), trimethoprimsulfamethoxazole (1.25 mg/23 mg), colistin (10 mg), and tigecycline (15 mg) antibiotic disks (Oxoid, Hampshire, UK) were used. Pseudomonas aeruginosa (ATCC 27853) was included as a quality control strain. For colistin and tigecycline, the interpretive criteria of Gales et al. (10) and Jones et al. (14) , respectively, were applied. The imipenem-resistant strains detected by the disk diffusion method were confirmed by the imipenem E-test (Oxoid).
The clonal relationship of the isolates was determined by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) using the ApaI restriction enzyme (15) . The PFGE results were evaluated according to the interpretation criteria of Tenover et al. (16) . Molecular typing and evaluation of the PFGE results were performed at the Turkish National Public Health Agency, Molecular Microbiology Research and Application Laboratory, Ankara, Turkey. 
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A. baumannii clinical isolates were cultured from wound (1 isolate), urine (1 isolate), and sputum (4 isolates) samples from 5 patients, 2 of which had respiratory failure associated with pneumonia, one had chronic obstructive lung disease (COLD), one had hemorrhagic infarction and respiratory failure, and one underwent surgery due to a traffic accident. Four of the patients were relatively older, received long-term antibiotic treatment, had prolonged hospitalization, and were mechanically ventilated. All the patients died as a result of A. baumannii sepsis. A total of 15 A. baumannii isolates were recovered from the 43 environmental samples. Of the 15 isolates, 12 were isolated from the IR and 3 were isolated from the ICU. Detailed information regarding the isolation source and epidemiological information of the isolates are provided in Table 1 .
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing of the patient isolates revealed that all the isolates were susceptible to colistin, tigecycline, and netilmicin, but resistant to piperacillin, cefepime, ceftazidime, ceftriaxone, imipenem, meropenem, gentamicin, amikacin, levofloxacin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, and ampicillinsulbactam. Three of the 15 environmental isolates, which were recovered from the mechanical ventilator, medicine cabinet, and patient file in the IR, were susceptible to amikacin, gentamicin, colistin, tigecycline, and netilmicin, but resistant to all the other antibiotics. One isolate recovered from the surface of a shelf in the IR was susceptible to gentamicin, colistin, tigecycline, and netilmicin; intermediate resistant to amikacin; and resistant to all the other antibiotics. The remaining environmental isolates were susceptible to colistin, tigecycline, and netilmicin but resistant to the other antibiotics. All the isolates from the patient and environmental samples in our study were determined to be multidrug resistant (MDR) according to the description of Peleg et al. (17) .
Based on the resistance patterns to the antibiotics (amikacin and gentamicin), which showed variation among the isolates tested, 3 different antibiotypes (a, b, and c) were identified (Table 1) . PFGE typing of the 21 A. baumannii isolates yielded a unique PFGE profile, which comprised 14 DNA fragments resulting from restriction of the chromosome with ApaI enzyme. As shown in Fig. 1 , regardless of the isolation source and date, all the clinical and environmental isolates exhibited indistinguishable pulsotypes.
A. baumannii is an emerging opportunistic pathogen that causes a wide range of nosocomial infections and exhibits MDR worldwide (18, 19) . In this study, MDR A. baumannii isolates were recovered over a relatively short period (from June 4 to June 25, 2011) from various surfaces in the IR and ICU as well as from patient samples. This was thought to be an outbreak in this hospital due to the failure to comply with rules regarding contact isolation precautions and inadequate hygiene, which resulted in cross-contamination. PFGE confirmed that the A. baumannii environmental and clinical isolates originated from a single clone. In accordance with our results, A. baumannii outbreaks originating from patient environments have been reported from different hospitals (5, 7, 9, 18, 20) . In contrast to PFGE typing results, antibiotyping revealed one main group including 80.1z of the isolates (type a, 17 isolates) and 2 small groups, type b including 3 isolates and type c including 1 isolate. Thus, it may be possible 247 that the loss of resistance genes results in the production of clonally related strains exhibiting different antibiotic resistance patterns. In accordance with our data, previous studies also indicated discrepancies between antibiotyping and PFGE typing of the A. baumannii isolates (9, 21) . Because of the intrinsic or acquired-resistance mechanisms, it is difficult to treat A. baumannii infections (22) . Previously, carbapenems were known to be the most effective antibiotics; however, recently, the use of broad-spectrum cephalosporins such as ceftazidime and cefotaxime, carbapenems, and fluoroquinolones has led to an increase in MDR among Acinetobacter spp. (18, 23) . In particular, in the last few years, carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii strains have become prevalent worldwide (18) . In the present study, the A. baumannii isolates were MDR. All the patient and environment isolates were susceptible to tigecycline, colistin, and netilmicin, few were also susceptible to amikacin and gentamicin, whereas all were resistant to other antibiotics, including carbapenem.
A. baumannii isolates can survive for several weeks in the hospital environment (24) . The prevention of nosocomial infections caused by these bacteria can be accomplished by active surveillance and contact isolation of colonized and infected patients, aseptic care of endotracheal and vascular tubes, and general improvements in hand hygiene of healthcare workers, which is the most difficult measure to implement. Despite the presence of standard infection control measures, the emergence of this outbreak was thought to be caused by several factors. These mainly included the insufficient number of personnel and lack of compliance with rules regarding entrance into the ICU. Thus, infection control training for all hospital staff, particularly new personnel who work in the ICU, was provided by the hospital infection control committee. This has contributed to the reduction of bacterial transmission between the staff and patient; patient and patient; staff, equipment, and patient; and patient units. As a result of these attempts, no new outbreak has been recorded in facility.
